ADDRESS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) "ON PROPOSED EXTE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, SEPI'EMBER J'-f , 1959.
Mr. President, I am convinced beyond any shadow of a doubt ;

I

that the Senate is making no contribution to the welfare of the
country /by even considering an extension of the Civil Rights
Commission.

The consideration of such an extension would have been

even more unfortunate had it been undertaken without having
available to us the report of the Civil Rights Commission.
In reading the report of this Commission, Senators should
keep in mind that this is the report of a commission which was
promoted as a group which would deal exclusively with voting rights.
I do not believe that any of us were deceived in 1957, and I know
that I was not so deceived.

The Commission has, of course,

presumed to enter into a discussion of race relations in the fields
of education and housing, as well as voting .

Obviously, the

information on which the Commissioners base their discussion could
not be dignified by calling it a study .
I shall review briefly what I can only describe as the
illogical ramblings and babblings of unsound thinking ; and from
time to time, I shall also note with pleasure that there are those
among the Commissioners who indicate by their individual opinions
and statements contained in the report that they, unlike the staff
and the other Commissioners, have not completely lost touch with
reality.
In the field of voting the Commission made a total of five
so-called findings and recommendations.

I shall merely note at

this point that Commissioner Battle's dissent on all five findings
and recommendations indicates that the Gommission was not without
a rational thinker among its group, had it chosen to follow the
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~eadership of good judgment and clear thinking
The first finding of the Commission in the field of voting
is believable to me.

Obviously, the Commissioners who joined in

the remaining findings and recommendations in the voting area did
not believe it themselves, however, for if they had, they could
have drawn no conclusions whatsoever--much less any recommendations .
I quote the first two sentences of the first finding of the
Commission:
"The Commission finds that there is a general
deficiency of information pertinent to the phenomenon
of non-voting.

There is a general lack of reliable

information on voting according to race, color, or
national origin, and there is no single repository of
the fragmentary information available."
It is obvious that if one believes that this finding of the
Commission is correct, it would be senseless to attach any
credibility to any additional part of the Commission's report on
voting..
The Commission recommends that the Bureau of Census undertake
a nation-wide compilation of registration and voting statistics to
include a count of individuals by race, color, and national origin
who are registered and the frequence of their voting in the past
ten years .
Mr. President, I heartily indorse this recommendation .

I

do not believe that anyone could conceive of a more practical and
a more suitable replacement for the Civil Rights Commission than
the census suggested by the Commission itself .

It should be quite

apparent that until the information which the Commission finds to
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be practically non-existent can be compiled, no sensible study nor
logical conclusion can be accomplished.
Mr. President, had the Commission stopped at this point in
its report, it would have accomplished more good than I have ever
conceived that it could do.

I say this with full awareness that

the Commission's conclusion, arrived at after two years of
existence, could have been reached by any logical man after a few
casual inquiries.

Unfortunately, the Commission did not stop at

this point; and in the remainder of the report, those of the
Commission who advance specific proposals confirm beyond a doubt
that this Commission has contributed and is contributing more to
racial unrest, tension and bad relations than any other force or
factor which has been conceived by Congress in modern times.
Now, Mr. President, let us look at other so-called findings
and recommendations of the Commission, concerning which the
Commission has admitted there is practically no information avail
able on which to base any finding or recommendation.

Some of the

Commissioners-Xil~IJC:llllllQ~~IXIIXJI.IXlflialll*MXllXllXI.IIIlllllXll

UIU~~X-made a finding that there is a lack of uniformity
of laws with respect to the preservation of voting records.
Mr. President, this is indeed a profound revelation.

It is profound

in spite of the fact that it is what our forefathers and the drafters
of the Constitution intended in the first place, and what is
basically inherent in our whole system of government, in the second
place.

The very fact that we do not yet have a totalitarian

government should have been enough in itself to indicate that the
States still had the right to have differences in their laws on a
- 3 -

subject which is exclusively within the sovereign power and
authority of each of the several States.
It is in the recommendation, Mr. President, that either the
utter irresponsibility, or abysmal ignorance, of those Commissioners
who joined in this recommendation stands out.

These Commissioners

recommended that the Federal Government enact legislation requiring
the maintenance of all voting records for a period of five years
and that such voting records be open to public inspection.

Such

a statute would obviously be unconstitutional, but the remainder
of this report proves unquestionably that such a consideration
plays no part in the judgment of the avid integrationist members
of the Commission.
The third item listed as a "recommendation" under the
discussion of voting is, to say the least, a confusing compilation
of words lacking not only a complete thought, but any thought at
all.

The discussion called "background", when combined with the

so-called findings, convey a rather hazy impression that the
Commission is lamenting the fact that some private citizens do
not choose to serve on registration boards.
This discussion mentions the fact that in some instances,
some members of the boards resigned their post, and State officials
responsible for filling the vacancies have delayed in doing so.
The Commission concludes that such conduct, presumably by the
resignees and the State officials, is "arbitrary, capricious and
without legal cause or justification."

To remedy the situation,

if indeed the Commission has any particular situation in mind,
the Commission recommends that an additional section be added to
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Part IV of the so-called Civil Rights Act of 1957 to prohibit
any person from being a non-feasor "under color of State law,
arbitrarily, without legal justification or cause, " if any such
non-feasance results in somebody being unable to register.
Consideration of the lack of constitutional authority for the
Federal Government to interfere in State matters is again belied
by this so-called recommendation.
The next discussion of the Commission included under the
topic of voting has nothing whatsoever to do with voting--and this,
incidentally, is in line with the organization of the rest of
this report and the thinking which spawned it .

At this point the

report goes into the matter of witnesses who decline to testify
before this insidious body .

As in so many instances, the so-called

recommendations have, not surprisingly, attempted to justify
expanded authority for the Commission.

In ·this particular instance,

those of the Commission-~lUt'J(1!ffli~JC:11l:ffll:~*--who joined in
this recommendation, would have the Commission authorized to apply
directly to the appropriate United States District Court for
orders enforcing subpoenas where the subpoenaed person declined to
testify .
After this diversion into matters more extraneous even than
the other parts of the report, the Commission returned to a
discussion of persons declining to serve on registration boards.
At this point, there is an additional so-called recommendation which
surpasses by a considerable extent in complete disregard of the
Constitution and our federated republican form of government any
thing that has come previously in the report.
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This proposal is

for the appointment of a federal registrar who would determine
~,

what persons under the terms of State law were eligible to vote and
would dictate the registration lists to the State boards of registra
tion.

Such a proposal would not only be unconstitutional, but

woul~ in fact, establish a federal dictatorship--if indeed it could
be enforced.

One would think that the authors of such a proposal

were existing mentally in Reconstruction days and writing regula
tions for the conduct of civil affairs by the occupying Union
troops.

It might come as a surprise to the authors of this proposal

and others of a similar mind, but the fact is that the South is no
longer a conquered province.

Further, the South has never been,

nor will it ever be, conquered by the enactment of such proposals.
Next, the report, apparently for the first time, acknowledges
the existence of the United States Constitution and, even more
surprisingly, the acknowledgment is by the three most avid
integrationist Connnissioners.

Their acknowledgment, however, is

only in passing and for the sole purpose of zeroing in on the
target they forewith propose to destroy.

Their proposal for

destruction embodies a constitutional amendment which would
transfer all substantial control and authority over the eligibility
of voters from the States, where it now resides, to the Federal
Government, where it can only reside in tyranny.
I would note at this point that three of the Connnissioners
opposed the proposal of such a constitutional amendment, and it is
to their everlasting credit that they recognize the inherent
danger of such a proposal.
Before passing from this particular proposal, it is worthy
to note, in connection with the rationale which prompted the
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proposal, how the three avid integrationists justified the elimina
tion of any literacy tests from voting eligibility requirements.
First, the Commission noted that the march of education has
almost eliminated illiteracy.

This they followed with the following

unbelievably unrealistic rationale:
"In a nation dedicated to the full development
of every citizen's human potential, there is no excuse
for whatever illtteracy that may remain.

Ratification

of the proposed amendment would, we believe, provide an
additional incentive for its total elimination.

Mean

while, abundant information about political candidates
and issues is available to all by way of television
and radio."
Such shallowness of mental process could only stem from the
deepest of bias.
Mr. President, before turning to the next Portion of what
someone in a fit of delusion has mistitled a "report", I would
remind the Senate that the first so-called finding under the voting
section recognizes that there is an almost complete absence of
information on this particular subject.

Nothing could better prove

the truth of this first so-called finding than the remainder of
the section on voting. '
In the portion of the report which purports to deal with the
field of so-called civil rights and education, the Commission does
not find, but certainly indicates by its language, that there is
also a dearth of knowledge--in the minds of those who wrote this
report, at least--on this particular feature.
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The initial so-called

finding on education by some Commissioners--again, there is no
way of telling how many--is to the effect that there is no
"guidance" for those communities or school officials who might
desire to integrate their schools.

This is followed by what is

titled a "recommendation" that the Civil Rights Commission be
authorized to collect and make available various schemes for
integrating the races in the public schools, in addition to
authorizing the Civil Rights Commission to establish an ¥advisory
and conciliation service" for school integration.
Mr. President, in my State at least, I can assure the Senate
that there is no desire--much less demand--for the advice or
conciliation efforts, nor for the integration schemes, of this or
any other federal commission.
desire exists anywhere.

I doubt seriously whether any such

This is just another of those self-serving,

self-perpetuating, empire-building justifications .
The only other proposal which is titled a "recommendation"
in the field of education is to the effect that the Office of
Education and the Bureau of Census conduct a school census to show
the number and race of students in public schools.

This proposal

is included as an answer to the surprising finding that in agencies
of the Federal Government and in most State agencies, the records
are not kept separate on the basis of race so that there is no
way in which to tell how many of the students are of what color.
The agitators in the race relations field have long demanded, and
apparently finally achieved, the abolition of a most practical and
realistic device--the indication of a person's race on his record.
Rather than acknowledge that the abolition of this practice was a
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mistake in the first place, the race agitators would now have the
records duplicated with the accent on race by a federal agency.
Quite frankly, Mr. President, such mental gynmastics repulse me.
Once again, Mr. President, the three avid integrationists on
the Commission take off on their own proposals on education at this
point in the report.

In effect they would have all financial

assistance of the Federal Government tied to integration practices
in--and I quote-- 11 both publicly and privately supported" institu
tions of higher education.

Even if the Fourteenth Amendment did

apply in such a way that public segregated schools could not be
maintained and this is emphatically not the case--even the errant
and constitutionally unconscious occupants of the Supreme Court
admit that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to State action;
and indeed in the discussion of their own proposal, these three
Commissioners parrot the words "only State action" but apparently
without the slightest understanding of the meaning of this phrase.
The remaining three members of the Commission wrote their
best dissent on this point, stating that they could not "endorse
a program of economic coercion" and that this proposal which dealt
with institutions of higher education was completely without the
jurisdiction of the Commission under the terms of the Act by which
it was created.

The dissent also reveals that the staff studies

of the Commission were limited exclusively in the field of education
to elementary and secondary public schools, not private at any
level, nor institutions of higher education, whether public or
private.

This is but another indication, if indeed any additional

indication is necessary, that the entirety of the report is a
matter of conjecture rather than any intelligent studious approach.
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On the subject of housing, I gather that although there are
a number of proposals which are entitled reccmmendations contained
in this section of the report, none of them has the support of a
majority of the Commission, and, therefore, could hardly be
considered recommendations.

The proposals themselves are confusingly

worded, ineptly expressed, and hazy in content.
One of the so-called findings which should be of particular
interest to the Congress is the fact that the Federal Government
plays a major role in housing.

I am happy to note that by virtue

of this body's action recently, the Federal Government will play a
slightly less major role in housing this year than was earlier
supposed.
The proposals themselves are easily summarized.

They would

have the President issue Executive Orders to enforce integration
of the races in housing in which the Federal Government had any
part or participation.

In addition, the proposals would have the

Federal Government go much further into the fields of public
housing and urban renewal.
These proposals are no surprise to me.

I have long realized

that the race agitators propose to use housing as a tool to mix
the races,

The three members of the Commission who dissented

summed up the proposals quite aptly as suggesting

11

fixed programs

of mixing the races anywhere and everywhere regardless of the
wishes of either race. 11

In their proposals the avid integrationists

on the Commission spell out the methods by which housing can be
used to integrate the races. These are interesting to note because
often
their use is more/by surreptitious means, and here we have them
spelled out in the open.

For instance, they would adopt a policy
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a

of "scatteration 11 in public housing by sprinkling public housing
units throughout residential areas and installing in them persons
of a race different from those living in the community.

In this

connection it is interesting to note that these Commissioners are
as much concerned with the problem of getting white people to live
in all-Negro units as they are with getting scme Negroes to live
in all-white units .

They recognize, it seems , that the members of

neither race ordinarily desire to force themselves on the other.
Mr . President, the policy of "scatteration" is nothing new
to the Congress of the United States .

I distinctly recall that

such a policy was incorporated in the Omnibus Housing Bill reported
by the Banking and Currency Committee of the Senate in 1958 but
was deleted by an amendment I offered on the floor.
Mr. President, this report should be read by every member of
this body before he votes on the question of continuing the
existence of this Commission.

A knowledge of what recommendations

were made generally or, indeed, whether there were recommendations
at all is not sufficient.

There is much revealing language in this

report for all its confusion and obscurity.

I would like to give

two illustrations.
As I mentioned when I was reviewing the section of the report
which purported to deal with voting, the report took a diversion
to lament the fact that some citizens were disinclined to serve on
State registration boards.

In this discussion the report attributes

to such persons as one reason for their refusal to serve the "fear
of being 'hounded' by the United States Civil Rights Commission."
What further proof could be needed that the Commission itself is a
principal instrument of racial strife and voting difficulties?
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Even more revealing with regard to the attitude of some of the
more avid integrationists on the Commission itself is a statement
by Commissioner Hesburgh.

I do not believe I have ever heard the

Marxist philosophy more succinctly stated than in the words of
Commissioner Hesburgh in his comments near the end of the report,
where he said:

"Again, the use of public money for the benefit

of all, equal opportunity, is a cardinal principle. 11
The question before this body is whether to continue an
ill-conceived instrument of racial strife, wielded under the
influence of philosophies alien to all that true and patriotic
Americans hold dear.
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When the so-called civil rights bill bf 1957 was considered
by this body, I opposed the bill, including the creation of the
Civil Rights Commission.

Although I spoke at some length concerning

the defects of the proposal to create such a body, my objections
fell largely on emotion-closed ears.

I would like to recall to

the Senate some of my comments on what was at that time a proposed
Civil Rights Commission.

On that occasion, I said:

"Mr. President, I am opposed to the creation of a
Commission on Civil Rights as proposed in Part I of
(

H. R. 6127.
To begin with, there is absolutely no need or
reason for the establishment of such a Commission.
If there were any necessity for an investigation in
the field of civil rights, such an investigation
should be conducted by the States or by an appropriate
Committee of the Congress, acting within the jurisdiction
of congressional authority.

It should not be done

by a Commission.
(

I also object to Part I of H. R. 6127 because of
the fact that it places duties upon the Commission and
endows it with powers which no governmental commission
should have.
In fact, Mr. President, the language of the bill
proposing to establish this Commission is so broad and
so general that it may encompass more evils than have
yet been detected in it.
Under its duties and powers the Commission would
be able to subpoena citizens to appear before it to
answer questions on many subjects outside the scope
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of elections and voting rights.
Section 104 (a) provides The Commission shall-"(l) investigate allegations in writing under
oath or affirmation that certain citizens
of the United States are being deprived
of their right to vote and have that vote
counted by reason of their color, race,
religion, or national origin; which writing,
under oath or affirmation, shall set forth
the facts upon which such belief or beliefs
are based;"

Mr. President, the bill, in Part IV, contains an
additional protection of the voting right of citizens above
and beyond present State and Federal laws.

Provision is

made for enforcement of Part IV, and there were already
sufficient enforcement provisions to carry out the intent
of the existing State and Federal laws.

I do not see

how a Commission could enhance the investigative powers
of law enforcement officers nor the enforcement and
punitive authority of the courts.
I can see no valid reason why a Commission should be
created, in addition to the legal enforcement procedures,
unless the purpose is for the Commission to stir up
litigation among our people.
This bill has been advertised, promoted, and bally
hooed as a right to vote bill.

However, I want to cite

two paragraphs which give broad authority for investiga
tions other than alleged violations of a person's right
to vote.
-105-

Section 104 (a) provides The Commission shall-"(2) study and collect information concerning legal
developments constitu.ting a denial of equal
protection of the laws under the Constitution; ·
and

"(3) appraise the laws and policies of the Federal
Government with respect to equal protection of
the laws under the Constitution."
Instead of limiting the power' of the Commiesion, these
two paragraphs provide it with carte blanche authority
to probe into and meddle into every phase of the rela
tions existing between individuals which the Commi~sion
and members of its staff could conjure up.
I want to call particular attention to a divergence
in language between paragraphs 2 and 3.

Paragraph 2

refers to a study of "legal developments constituting
a denial of equal protection."

Paragraph 3 says

"appraise the laws and policies of the Federal Govern
ment with respect to equal protection."
The significant thing here is the omission of the
specific intent of paragraph 2.

Although the language

of paragraph 2 is obscure and omits a governmental
reference, it obviously must refer to State and local
governments, else it would be redundant and have no
meaning at all.
Also, as I pointed out, investigations conducted
under paragraphs 2 and 3 could go far afield from the
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question of voting rights.

The Commission could exert

its efforts toward bringing about integration of the
races in the schools, and elsewhere, under the authoriza
tion of these two paragraphso

Combining its authority to

investigate on an unlimited scale and its authority to
force witnesses to answer questions, the Commission would
have a powerful weapon.

Mr. President, I do not believe the people of this
country realize the virtually unlimited powers of inquiry
which would be placed in the hands of this political
Commission.

While the Commission would have no power

to implement its desires, I do not believe the people of
this country want such a totalitarian type of "persuasion"
imposed upon them.
Part I of H. R. 6127 purports to create a Civil Rights
Commission.

Actually, it would create a traveling investi

gation Commission.
Section 103 (b) of Part I also would place tremen
dous power within the grasp of the Attorney General with
reference to members of the Commission "otherwise in
the service of the Government."

The clear implication

is that whoever drafted this scheme to send traveling
agents over the country intended to make use of certain
members of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
I don 9 t believe it would be necessary to look farther
than the Justice Department to determine where Commission
members already in Government service would be secured.
By placing his employees on the Commission, the Attorney
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General would transform the traveling agents into an
additional investigative arm of the Justice Department.

Mr. President, I next call attention to the potential
abuse found in Section 102 (g) under the innocuous
title,

0

Rules of Procedure of the Commissiono"

That

section provides that:
"No evidence or testimony taken in executive
session may be released or used in public
sessions without the consent of the Commis

(

sion.

'Whoe-ver relecl.ses or uses in public

without the consent of the Commission evi
dence or testimony taken in executive
session shall be fined not more than $1,000,
or : i.mpr:i.soned for not more than one year."
In an editorial of July 26, 1957, The Washington
Post very correctly pointed out how this section
could be used to imprison rsporters and other citizens
for disclosure of what a witness might voluntarily tell
them.

This editorial provides a penetrating and en

lightening criticism of this section.

Because of its

pertinency and fine analysis, I shall read the last
three paragraphs of the editorial which is entitled
"Open Rights Hearings," which states:
"The bill contains an invitation to the com
mission to operate behind closed doors.
provides that

9 if

It

the commission determines

that evidence or testimony at any hearing
may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate
-JCS-

any person, it shall ••• receive such evider-ce
testimony in executive session ••• ,

Some

closed sessions may be necessary to avoid
unfair reflections upon individuals, but
these should certainly be an exception to
the general rule,

In our opinion, this

section ought to be rewritten in a more
positive vein to provide that sessions of

(

the commission should be open to the public,
unless it should find that closed hearings
were essential to avoid unfairness.
"The House also wrote into the bill a dan
gerous section providing for the fining or
imprisonment for not more than one year of
anyone who might

9 release

or use in public,'

without the consent of the commission, any
testimony taken behind closed doors.

(

If

the commission should choose to operate
under cover, without any valid reason to
do so, newspaper reporters and other citizens
could be jailed for d~sclosure of what a
witness might voluntarily tell them.

This

is a penalty that has been shunned even in
matters affecting national security.

Such

a provision is an invitation to abuse and
a serious menace to the right of the people
to know about the activities of governmental
agencies,
-109-

0

It:. is well to remember that this would

not be merely a study cummission.

In

addition it would be under 0bligation to
investigate allegations that persons were
being deprived of their rights under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendmentso

It

could subpoena witnesses and documents and
appeal to the courts for enforcement
such edicts.

of

Its powers would be such that

it should be held to scrupulous rules of
fairness.

To encourage the commission to

operate in secret, and then to penalize
news media and citizens for disclo~ing
what should have been public in the first
place, ¥culd be the sort of mistake that
Congress ought to avoid at the outset."
Mre President, I think the points made in the editorial

are clear and valid.
(

Secrecy in the activities of such

a Commission could only lead to a denial of the rights
of an individual rather than to protection of his rights.
Another subject which must not be passed over is
the subpoena power of the Commission.

Section 105 (f)

provides that "subpoenas for the attendance and testimony
of ~itnesses or the production of written or other matter
may be issued in accordance with the rules of the commission ••• "

Mr. President, many of the committees and special
committees of the Congress do not have this power.
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The

Truman Commission on Civil Rights did not have it.
The subpoena is a punitive measure, generally reserved
for penal process whereby powers are granted to force
testimony which would not otherwise be available.

If

the proposed commission were simply a fact-finding
commission and non-political, the extreme power to
force testimony by the use of a subpoena would not
be needed.
Neither would the power contained in Section 105 (g)
which provides that Federal courts shall have the power,
upon application by the Attorney General, to issue "an
order requiring" a witness to answer a subpoena of the
commission and "any failure to obey such order of the
court may be punished by said court as a contempt
thereof."
The power of subpoena in the hands of a political
commission and the additional power to enforce its
subpoenas by court order diverge from the authority of
the traditional American fact-finding commission.
I look with suspicion upon such a commission so
endowed with authority, and I object to its establishment.

Mr. President, I want to discuss another reason,
briefly, why I would be opposed to the establishment of
the commission proposed in Part I of H. R. 6127.

Every

appropriation bill which has come before the Senate this
year has been reduced by the Senate below the budget
request.

The people of this country have called upon

the members of Congress to reduce the costs of government,
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not to increase them by creating new agencies or
commissions.
The advocates of the commission might argue that
the cost of its operation would not be great, but no
where in the records of the hearings have I found an
estimate of what the total cost would be.

If the

commission were to exist only for the two years provided in the bill , the compensation and per diem allowan~e
of commission members would amount to more than a
quarter of a million dollars, not counting their travel
allowances.
Since there is no limitation on the number of
personnel which might ba appointed by the Commission,
there is no way to estimate the ultimate cost of personnel
salaries and expens~s.

Since the commission is designed

to travel over the country at will, very heavy travel
expenses undoubtedly would be incurred.
The taxpayers would never know how many of their
tax dollars ware wasted by virtue of the seemingly
innocuous language in Section 105 (e).

Unknown,

concealed costs are not, however, the only dangers
lurking in that subsection.

A serious departure from

sound legislative procedure is also involved.
In the past, when creating an agency or commission,
Congress retained control of its creation by the appro
priation power.

This is a wonderful check, Mr. President,

against the abuse or misuse of commission authority.
Scrupulous care should be taken to preserve it.
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However, Section 105 (e) provides that:
"All Federal agencies shall cooperate fully
with the commission to the end that it may
effectively carry out its functions and duties."
Thus the Civil Rights Commission could call on the
other governmental agencies to perform many of its tasks.
Congressional control over the commission would be much
less than if the commission had to depend on its own
appropriations and would not be permitted to use the
resources of other agencies.

Once the commission is

created, only another law can check its activity during
the period of its existence.
Another thing that concerns me about this commission
is the fact that once a government agency or commission
is established, nothing else on earth so nearly approaches
eternal existence as that government agency or commission.

Mr. President, I fear that the two-year limitation placed
upon the commission in this bill would simply be a
starting point, and the people of this country should
realize that at this time.
With further reference to Section 104 (a), I want
to point out the use of the mandatory word "shall."
This word requires the commission to investigate all
sworn allegations submitted to the commission of any
citizen allegedly being deprived of his right to vote.
But the provision neglects to require that such
allegations be submitted by parties in interest--not
simply by some meddler who seeks to create trouble
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between other persons.

This is another provision of

this bill similar to Section 131 (c) which would permit
the Attorney General to make the United States a party
to a case without the consent of the party actually
involved.
Another objection to 104 (a) is that under this
provision a person could make an allegation to the
commission, against a person who was not even a citizen
of the same State.

(

Even so, under the mandatory language

of Section 104 (a), the commission would be required to
make an investigation of the charges.
Since the commission is limited by Section 102 (k)
to subpoenaing witnesses to hearings only within the
State of residence of the witness, there would be no
opportunity in such a situation for the accused to con
front his accuser.

Charges against a person should not

be accepted by the commission unless the accuser is a
citizen of the same State as the person he is charging
with a violation of the law.
Also, Mr. President, once the commission has received
the sworn allegation, there is no requirement that other
testimony received relating to the allegation be taken
under oath.

Failure to make all persons giving testimony

subject to perjury prosecutions in the event they testify
to falsehoods would surely destroy the value of any such
testimony received.
The commission could and might adopt a rule to require
sworn testimony; but I should not like to see the Senate
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leave that point to the discretion of the commission
because, in my judgment, the Congress should require
that practice to be followed0

Mr. President, as I stated earlier, it ·is my view
that an inquiry into the field of civil rights, or so
called civil rights, is entirely unnecessary at this
time.

The laws of the States and the federal laws are

being enforced effectively.
Should there come a time when information might be

(

needed on this subject, the Congress should not delegate
its authority to a commission.

In such a delicate and

sensitive area, the Congress should proceed with delibera
tion and care.

The appropriate committees of the Congress

itself should hold hearings limited to the jurisdiction
of the Congress, and the Congress should make its own
determination as to the need for legislation.
There is no present indication that any such study
will be needed."
Following these r~marks, Mr. President, I discussed the consti
tutional objections to such a commission.

Prior to the creation of

the commission, I was bothered by grave questions as to the con
stitutionality of such an investigatory group.

Passage of time

since its creation has strengthened and reinforced my position
against the constitutionality of the commission.
I did not and do not perceive from the debate on the so-called
Civil Rights Act of 1957 that there was any intention by Senators
to subject the commission to provisions of the Administrative Proce
dure Act.

Had they dared, I strongly suspect that the proponents

of that Act would have specifically negated the applicability of
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the Administrative Procedure Act.

The proponents of the 1957 Act

·lfanted all they could get in the way of authority for their vicious
unit of disharmony.

They dreamed of a true

with arbitrary persecution powers.

0

star chamber", cloaked

In their obsession with agitating

the race issue, they evidenced no concern whatsoever with true civil
rights, or as I prefer to call them, individual liberties.

Their

extreme fanatacism on the issue of RACE was paramount and exclusive-
without objectivity, without balance, and without respect for tha

(

rrsupreme Law of the Land."
My conclusions are not products of speculation or conjecture,

Mr. President.

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 deals

rather exhaustively, for an act of this type, with the rules and
rule-making authority of the Civil Rights Commission.

A perusal

of this section reveals that it is designed almost exclusively as
a grant of power to the commission, rather than a limitation for the
protection of the rights of individuals.

The text of this section

is as follows:
(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to
act as Chairman at a hearing of the Commission shall
announce in an opening statement the subject of the hearing.
(b) A copy of the Commission 9 s rules shall be made
available to the witness before the Commission.
(c) Witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their
own

counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning

their constitutional rights.
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punish breaches
of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part
of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings.
-116-

(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or
testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or
incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence
or testimony in executive session; ('2) afford such person
an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and {3)
receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena
additional witnesses.
(f) Exce~t as provided in sections 102 and 105 (f) of
this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission
shall dispose of requests to subpoena additional witnesses,
{g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session
may be released or used in pu~lic sessions without the con
sent of the Commission.

Whoever releases or uses in public

witho~t ·. the consent of ~he C~mmission evidence or testi
mony taken in executive session shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year.
{h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may
submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writing for
inclusion in the record.

The Commission is the sole judge

of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its
hearings.
{i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may obtain
a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public session,
or, if given at an executive session, when authorized by
the Commission.

{j) A witness attending any session of the Commission
shall receive $4 for each day 9 s attendance and for the time
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necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same,
and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his
place of residence.

Witnesses who attend at points so far

removed from their respective residences as to prohibit
return thereto from day to day shall be en.titled to an addi
tional allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsistence,
including the time necessarily occupied in going to and
returning from the place of attendance.

Mileage payments

shall be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena
issued

on behalf of the Commission or any subcommittee

thereof.
(k} The Commission shall not issue any subpoena for the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the production
of written or other matter which would require the presence
of the party subpoenaed at a hearing to be held outside of
) the State, wherein the witness is found or resides or trans
~

usiness."
Mr. President, I invite the particular attention of the Senate

to sub-paragraph ( c) of Section 102~

"Witnesses at the hearings J!!il

be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose Qf $rlvising them
concerning their constitutional .r_ight,s."

Mr. President, seldom has a subsection been drafted by any Con
gress which has been so pregnant with basic deprivations and exclusions
of the historical standards of fair play which permeates our juris
prudence, and which we loosely refer to as due-process.

Let us examine

some of those procedural safeguards which are denied by this section.
First, the right of a person appearing before the commission to be
represented by counsel is negated.

Substituted for representation by
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counsel is the right--if it can be so broadly denominated--to be
accompanied by counsel.
defense.

Moral support is no substitute for an active

Such a provision can best be compared to n:iJ <>wing..an aea'JAS,ed

person to have a few sympathizers in the audience when he is sentenced.
But there is morel

The ridiculous is made fantasticl

The right

to be accompanied by counsel is itself--weak as it is--limited to one
exclusive purpose--that of advising the witness on his constitutional
rights.

Not on his legal rights, Mr. President, but only on his

constitutional rights. I wonder, Mr. President, if the drafters of
this language contemplated a monitoring of the advice of the accompany
ing counsel to assure that counsel would not go astray and speak to
the witness concerning some statutory right which might accrue ta the
benefit of the witness.
Does this subsection indicate a concern with individual liberty,
or does it rather have the appearance of a deceitful gloss that gives
an impression of preserving due process while actually emasculating it?
The proponents of this legislation also wanted to insure that the

(

4ccompanying ru2.,_ll!l§_el could be prevented from conducting themselves as
conscientious attorneys, Mr. President--thus, was included subsection
( d) which reads:

"The Chairman or Acting Chairman may p1mish breaches

of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part of counsel,
by censure and exclusion from the hearings."
all import of Section 102, the

Judgi~g from the over

"JID" which prefixes "professional"

in subsection (d) must have been included by oversight.

Consistency

belies its inclusion.
Subsection (g) established the "star chamber" session of the
commission.

This subsection so completely ignores constitutional

safeguards contained in the Constitution and imposed by the people
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for the protection of individual liberties, that one would logically
conclude that its proponents had formerly existed in a vacuum, rather
than in a democratic soc~ety.

It is completely incompatible with

freedom of speech and the press.

It precludes the right of confronta

tion of accuser by the accused, as well as the right of cross-examina.
tion.

Its purport is reinforced by subsection (i), which specifies

that a witness may purchase a copy of his .2.!'fil testimony, but omits
any authorization for a witness to even

.§ll

the testimony of ari

1.ccuser.

Mr. President, I would be the first to admit,--nay, assert-that the requirements of "due process" vary considerably, depending
on the proceedings to which they are applied.

The requirements are

most strict when applied to a criminal prosecution.

In some proceedingt

where no basic right -of the individual is involved, little, if any,
application of due process safeguards are demanded by the Constitution
nor required by good conscience.
It should be clear, however, that a criminal prosGcution includes
~ore than the formal trial itselfo

Indeed, historically, much of the

concern which the courts have evidenced over the application of due
process in criminal prosecutions has been in the pre-trial area of
apprehension, and preparation of the prosecution case against the
accused.

This is the precise area into which the investigations of

the Civil Rights Commission were intended to, and in fact, did, fall.
By the terms of the Act itself, investigations by the commission
must be predicated on a complaint that either a statute or the Con
stitution has been violated.

The commission was given, and has exer

cised, the power to subpoena those accused.

Part II and Part III

strengthened the machinery for prosecution of violations established
by the commission.
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There can be but one logical conclusion.

The Civil Rights

Commission is unconstitutionalc
If there be any doubts--and I can conceive no basis for doubt-
of the unconstitutionality of this comission, stemming specifically
from the rule-making power granted in Section 102, consider the rul0s

----

of the commission.

"l.

They are as follows.

Under Public Law 85-315, Section 105(f), the Commis-

sion on Civil Rights may hold hearings and issue subpoenas 0r
authorize a subcommittee to hold hearings and issue subpoenas
under the following conditi'ons:
The Commission or on the authorization of the Commission
any subcommittee of two or more members, at least one of whom
shall be of each major poli'tical party, may, for the purpose
of carrying out the p~ovisions of this Act, hold such hearings
and act at such times and places as the Commission or such
authorized subcommittee may deem adviseable.

Subpoenas for the

attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of
written or other matter may be issued in accordance with the
rules of the Commission as contained in section 102(j) and
(k) of this Act, over the signature of the Chairman of the

Commission or of such subcommittee~ and may be served by any
person designated by such Chairman.
2.

All such hearings of the Commission will be governed by

the following statut~ry Rules of Procedure provided in Section 102
of Public Law $5-315:
(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to act as
Chairman at a hearing of the Commission shall announce in an
opening statement the subject of the hearing.
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(b) A copy of the Commisaion?s rules shall be made
available to the witness before the Comm~ssiono
(c) Witnesses at the hea~ings may be accompanied by
their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning
their constitutiona: rights.
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punj.sh breaches
of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part
of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings.
(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or
testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or
incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence
or testimony in executive session~ (2) afford such person
an opporttrriity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and (3)
receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena
additional witnesses.
(f) Except as provided in sections 102 and 105(f) of
this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission
shall dispose of requests to subpoena additional witnesseso
(g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session
may be re:.eased or used in public sessions without the consent
of the Commission.

Whoever releases or uses in public with

out the consent of the Commission evidence or testimony taken
in executive session shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned for not more than one year.
(h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may
submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writing for
inclusion in the record.

The Commission is the sole judge
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of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its
hearings.
(i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may
obtain a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public
session or, if given at an executive session, when authorized
by the Commission.

(j) A witness attending any session of the Commission
shall receive $4 for each day 9 s attendance and for the time
necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same,
and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his
place of residence.

Witnesses who attend at points so far

removed from their respective residences as to prohibit
return thereto from day to day shall be entitled to an additional
allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsistence, including
the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from
the place of attendance.
to

(

Mileage payments shall be tendered

the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf

of the Commission or any subcommittee thereof.
(k) The Commission shall not issue any subpoena for the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the production
of written or other matter which would require the presence
of the party subpoenaed at a hearing to be held outside of
the State, wherein the witness is found or resides or trans
acts business.

3.

In addition to these statutory provisions, the Commission

has adopted the following supplementary Rules of Procedure:
(a) All the provisions of Section 102 of Public Law

85-315, incorporated in Rule 2 above, shall be applicable
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to and govern the proceedings of all subcommittees appoint ad
by the Commission pursuant to Section 105(f) of Public Law 85315, incorporated in Rule 1 abov-e~
(b) At least two members of the Comm~ssion must be present
at any hearing of the Commission or of any sub-committee
thereof.
(c) The holding of hearings by the Commission or the
appointment of a subcommittee to hold hearings pursuant to
the provisions in Rule 1 above must be approved by a majcr(

ity of the members of the Commission or by a majority of the
members present at a meeting at which at least a quorum of
four members is present ..
(d) Subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses

or the production of written or other matter may be issued ov~r
the signature of the Chairman of the Commission by the Chairman
or by the Chairman upon the request of a member of the Commission
(e) Subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesse&
or the production of written or other matter may be issued over
the signature of the Chairman of a subcommittee appointed pur
suant to the provisions of Rule 1 above by the Chairman or by
the Chairman upon the request of a member of the subcommittee.
(f) An accurate transcript shall be made of the testimony of all witnesses in all hearings, either public or execu
tive sessions, of the Commission or of any subcommittee thereof.
Each witness shall have the right to inspect the record of his
own testimony.

A transcript copy of his testimony may be

purchased by a witness pursuant to Rule 2(i) above.

Transcript

copies of public sessions may be obtained by the public upon
payment of the cost thereof.
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{g) Any witness desiring to read a prepared statement
in a hearing shall file a copy with the Commission or sub
committee 24 hours in advance.

The Commission or subcommittee

shall decide whether to permit the reading of such statement,
(h) The Commission or subcommittee shall decide whether
written statements or documents submitted to it shall be
placed in the record of the hearing.
(i) Interrogation of witnesses at hearings shall be
conducted only by members of the Commission or by authorized
staff personnel.

(j) If the Commission pursuant to Rule 2(e), or any
subcommittee thereof, determines that evidence or testimony
at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate
any person, it shall advise such person that such evidence
has been given and it shall afford such person an opportunity
to read the pertinent testimony and to appear as a voluntary
witness or to file a sworn statement in his behalf.
(k) Subject to the physical limitations of the hearing
room and consideration of the physical comfort of Commission
members, staff, and witnesses, equal and reasonable access
for coverage of the hearings shall be provided to the various
means of communications, including newspapers, magazines,
radio, news reels, and television.

However, no witness shall

be televised, filmed or photographed during the hearing if he
objects on the ground of distraction, harassment, or physical
handicap.

4.

Public Law $5-315, Section 105(g) provides that in case ef

contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena of either the Commission
or a subcommittee thereof, any district court of the United States
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or the United States court of any Territory or possession, or
the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia, within the jurisdiction o·f which said person guilty
of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts
business, upon application by the Attorney General of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order
requiring such person to appear before the Commission or a
subcommittee thereof, there to produce evidence if so ordered,
or there to give testimony touching the matter under investiga-

(

l
L

~~on; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be

unished by said court as a contempt thereof. n
Mr. President, these are tr.e ~ules as approved and adopted by

the commission July 1, 1958.

They are beyond question responsive to

the terms of the Act which c:eated the commission.

They emphasize

by implementation and expansion the unconstitutionality of the act
creating the commission.
I am not alone in my assertions as to the constit~tional implica
tions of this Statute, Mr. Presidente

For instance, the State of

Arkansas, through its Attorney General, filed a brief with the
Federal District Court in Louisiana, which said in part:
Civil Rights Commission is extraordinary, if not unique,
in that it intends to function much the same as a congressional
investigating committee and if its apparent interpretation of
the law creating it (Civil Rights Act, Public Law, 85-315,
Title 42, USCA § 1975 et seq.) is sustained it possesses all
the power and authority of a "Star-Chamber" undertaking.

It

is the assumption by the Commission or the delegation by the
Congress of this power and authority which gives rise to the
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serious question of the Committee's legal existance.

If the

Civil Rights Commission is not subject to the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 USCA,

§§

1001 et seq.),

then that portion of the Civil Rights Act creating the
Commission is invalid as a violation of Article I and Amend
ments 5, 6 and 9 of the Constitution of the United States.
I.

THAT PORTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT CREATING THE CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMISSION IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY
THE CONGRESS AND IT DEPRIVES WITNESSES BEFORE IT OF THEIR RIGHTS
AS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The right of Congress to investigate through its own agency
is unquestioned.

This right is derived from its determination

or duty to legislate upon particular subject matter.

It may be

well to point out here that in the field assigned to the Civil
Rights Commission there was companion remedial legislation (42
USCA § 1971) thoroughly covering the subject matter the Commission
was supposed to investigate.

One may obliquely inquire at this

point es to what further legislation could be contemplated based
on any investigation and finding made by the Civil Rights Com
mission.

It is true that in U.S •. v, Rains, 172 F. Supp. 557,

Section 1971, paragraph (c) was held unconstitutional but the
remedy, if any, for that deficiency will be found in consti
tutional legislation, not further commission investigation.
It is well to keep in mind that this Commission is greatly
dissimilar to the great body of regulatory agencies which possess
investigative powers.

Those regulatory agencies investigate with

a view to determining facts in relation to violations, compliance,
etc., with the law they administer.
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The Civil Rights Commission

investigates for the sake of investigation.

There is no frame

work of law in which the Commission operates; in fact, there is
no law to administer an no authority to regulate.

As pointed

out in complainants 9 trial brief, the Commission is not limited
to the investigation of voting deprivations committed or caused
by state officers or even where an individual acting tmder the
guise of state authority deprives some person of his voting
privilege, but extends to every possible situation irrespective
of the authority of Congress to legislate with reference to that
situation.

This fact in itself is sufficient to render the Act

unconstitutional.

See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; Kil

bourn v. Thompson, 103 U.Sc 16S~

u.s~

v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp.

597.
If this Commission has been clothed with all the power and
authority of Congress, and the law creating the Commission is
very reminiscent of a House or Senate resolution creating a
special investigating committee of its members, it must, of course,
be bound by at least the same g=-ound rules and constitutional
limitations.

If it can be successfully argued that the Civj_l

Rights Commission is not subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act, then an inquiry must be made into what rules, regulations
and laws do apply to the Commission 9 s proceedings.

The only

place one can find the answer is in the Act itself, and even a
casual reading of the Act indicates that there is no answer.
To examine these provisions in the light of what the Commission
considers the limitations are, is to be startled if not shocked
by the ignoring of the constitutional rights of individuals
who may be called before it.

The rules of the committee reflect
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the validity of this statement.

The authority to make these

rules must be inferred from the provision of Section 1975a
(there is no express grant of such authority).

Section 1975a

(c) does allow witnesses to be accompanied by counsel "for the
purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights."
It does not provide that a witness may assert his constitutional
rights before the Commission.

If this last appears to be an un

worthy observation it is no less unworthy than the Commission's
conclusion regarding a witness's right to be informed of the
nature of the investigation or his right to cross-examine other
witnesses.

The Commission's power to investigate must be exercised

with due respect for the rights of witnesses appearing before it.
See Sinclaj_r v. U.tS., 279 U.,S. 2(,3.

The Commission by its rules

and attitude has indicated tha~ it considers itself and its
activities above the requirements of the constitution and the
restri~tion of fair play.

The real difficulty here is that

Congress has not provided any standard or means of accomplishing
the Commission's somewhat hazy ~ission.

Such a standard or means

must necessarily be present in order to validate the Commission 9 s
existance.

See U.S. v.

Wright, 48 F. Supp. 687.

c,

Thomas Stores, 49 F. Suppo 111; U.S. v.
The Civil Rights Commission, under the

guise of declaring procedural rules and investigative policy,
has legislated substantive laws out of existance.

If the Com

mission is correct in this assumption of such broad "rule making"
power, then Congress has delegated legislative authority which
even Congress itself may not possess.

It is no answer to the

problem posed here to say that the complainants or other wit
nesses may assert their rights when denied by the Commission
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through resor·t to the Court.

To single shot every invalid

"rule" which has or might be promulgated by the Commission
would place an insurmountable burden on those subject to
appearance before ito
II.
THE ·crvrL RIGHTS COMMISSION IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.
The Civil Rights Commission is operating and acting with
the expressed sanction of the Congress behind it and as such,
is an agency of the government.

Laster Vo Guy F. Atkinson Go.,

176 ,Fed. 2nd 984; Donahue v. George A. Fuller Co., 104 F. Supp.
145.

As an agency of the gove~nment, the Commission 9 s function

is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, unless exceptedo
The exceptions to the Administ~ative Procedure Act are few and
simple and a consideration of the exceptions set forth in the
Act show that the only possible way in which the Civil Rights
Commission could be excepted is through a proper and express
delegation of authority by law.

There is nothing in the Civil

Rights Act creating the Commision that even hints of an ex
ception.
9

Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative

Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in
view of the statement i .n

§

12 of the Act that

modifications must be express.' Marcello v. Bonds,

349

u.s.

302.

The protection afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act
should be equally available to protect personal rights as well
as·pr.operty rights.

l. A. Tucker Truck Lines v. u.s.,100 F. Supp.
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432.

The intended course of the Commission under its rules and

pronouncements as reflected in the complaint virtually strips
the complainants of all the protection sought to be afforded by
the Procedure Act.

This is exactly the sort of conduct the

Administrative Procedure Act was intended to prevent.
"The Administrative Procedure Act was framed as a
check upon administrators whose zeal might other
wise carry them to excess not contemplated in the
legislation creating their offices.

It creates

safeguards even narrower than the constitutional
ones, against arbitrary official encroachment on
private rights."

u. s.

u.s.

v. Morton Salt Co., 338

632.

It is not necessary to engage in extensive analysis of the
terms of 42 USCA § 1975e

The Civil Rights Commission is so

obviously an agency of the government that argument to the con
trary is facetious.

It is equally obvious that there is no

statement exempting the Comm:!.ssion from the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act and any rules making authority the
Commission may possess must be exercised only within the limita
tions placed upon it by the Administrative Procedure Act.n

Mr. President, the Attorney General of the sovereign State of
Arkansas is referri~g. in this brief to the body which the Congress
created in 1957, and into which it is proposed that we now breathe
life for another two years.

Mr. President, we have more than assertions of unconstitutionality
to face in assessing this proposal to extend the life of the Civil
Rights Commission.

We have a finding of the Court--not a State Court--131-

but a Federal Court, mind you.

The finding of the court to which

I refer is in the decision of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana in the case of Margaret M. Larche.
v. John A. Hannah, rendered July 12, 19590
is as follows~

(

(
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The order of the court

RULING ON APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
"We are called upon here to pass tentatively upon
one of the burning issues of our time -- the propriety
and validity of the Rules and Proceedings of the Civil
Rights Commission, as established by Congress in September,

1957.
"That Commission now proposes to hold a hearing, in
the Federal Court room at Shreveport, Louisiana, on
July 13, 1959, to investigate purported violations of
the civil voting rights of some 67 persons, who are said
to have filed sworn complaints with the Commission.
Pursuant to, and in implementation of, its plans, the
Commission has caused subpoenas, and subpoenas duces tecum,
to be served upon the plaintiffs in these suits, commanding
them to be present and give testimony at the hearing, and
requiring the 16 Registrars of Voters, who are plaintiffs
in Civil Action No. 7479, to bring with them, for inspection
and copying by the Commission, a large number of records
from their offices.
"These suits, brought against the members of the
Commission, and the Commission itself, were filed on July
10, 1959, and are addressed to the equitable powers of
this Court.

They seek to stay the effectiveness of the

Commission's subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, and to
restrain and enjoin the c.o nduct of the proposed hearing
itself, which, plaintiffs aver, under the Rules of Procedure
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adopted by the Commission, would violate their i\':.n.da
~ental constitutional rights and cause them immediate
and irreparable damage.

Moreover, praying that a

tnree-judge court be convened for that purpose, the
Registrar-plaintiffs ask that the Act creating the
Commission be declared violative of the Federal
Constitution, and thus unenforceable.
"Detailing their complaints, supported by sworn
affidavits and exhibits attached, (and here briefly
paraphrased), the Registrar-plaintiffs, in Civil
Action No. 7479, allege that between June 29, 1959,
and July 6, 1959, each of them were served with sub
poenas and subpoenas duces tecum, issued by the
Chairman of the Commission, commanding them to appear
and testify before the Commisiion on July 13, 1959,
and to bring their records with them: that they have
not been informed of the nature of the complaint or
complaints against them, nor have they been assured
that they will be confronted with the complaining wit
nesses~ that the Commission repeatedly has informed
the Attorney General of Louisiana, verbally and in
writing, that it would not, under any circunstances,
furnish plaintiffs with, or permit them to examine the
written complaints filed against them, nor would it
divulge the name or names of the secret complainants,
all of which is arbitrary and unreasonable, and in
violation of plaintiffs 9 fundamental rights.
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"They further aver that they, at all times, have
complied with the laws of the State of Louisiana,
but that the subpoenas served upon them would require
them to violate such laws, in that the Registrars'
records legally may not be removed from their offices,
except 'upon an order of a competent court', criminal
penalties being provided for violations of these statutes~
and that the Commission is not a 'competent court'.
Hence, they say, to comply with the subpoenas, they
would be violating the State laws, and subjecting
themselves to the penalties thus provided.
"These plaintiffs further allege that, attached
to the subpoenas served upon

them, was a mimeographed

document entitled 'Rules of Procedure for hearings of
the Commission on Civil Rights' in which appears the
following:

'(i) Interrogation of witnessess shall be

conducted only by members of the Commission or by
authorized staff personnel'; and that thereby
plaintiffs are deprived of their constitutional right
to cross-examine witnessess who may testify against
them.

They contend that the Commission and its

members thus are acting in an ultra vires manner in
1) attempting to force the plaintiffs to testify at
the proposed hearing without first advising them of
the nature of the complaint or complaints existing~
2) without allowing plaintiffs to be confronted by
the complaining witnesses~

3) not allowing plaintiffs
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to have counsel empowered to fully represent their
interests in such hearing;

4) not allowing cross

examination of the complaining witnesses~ and 5)
causing irreparable damage to plaintiffs by requiring
them to violate the Laws of Louisiana, which would
subject them to serious criminal penalties.

In their

brief, they also urge, as a direct incident of the
hearing itselr, with unnamed and unknown witnesses
testifying against them, not subject to cross-examination
by plaintiff's counsel, that they will be wrongfully
accused of violations of both Federal and State laws,
without adequate opportunity to disprove such
accusations, and thus be held up, by the Commission's
actions, to public opprobrium and scorn, all to their
irreparable injury and damage.
"They further contend that the Commission, being
an agency of the Executive branch of the Federal
Government, is subject to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and, as such, is
required to state explicitly the charges against
plaintiffs, to permit them to be confronted with
the witnesses against them, and to allow their
counsel fully to cross-examine such witnesses.
Accordingly, these plaintiffs seek the relief
hereinabove outlined.
"In general, the plaintiffs in Civil Action
No. 74$0, who are individual citizens of Louisiana,
make the same allegations and contentions as those in
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No~ 7479, except that they have not been called upon
to ~~educe any official records.

They do not challenge

the constitutionality of the Act cr9ating the Commission,
but otherwise their prayeT for relief is substantially
3imilar to that in No. 7479,
"Several days prior to July 10, 1959, we were
advised by plaintiffs' counsel that they would file
these suits on the date indicatedo

While, as a general

rule, applications for temporary restraining orders
are considered fil£ parte, solely on the face of the
verified complaint a~d any attached documents, because
of the national importance of the matters involved,
we immediately notified counsel for the Commission,
and its Vice-Chairman, Honorable Robert G. Storey
(a personal friend of the Court's, of long standing}
of our information, and invited them to be present
for a hearing on the applications.

The suits were

filed at 1:30 P. M. on July 10, and at 2:00 P. M.,
in open Court, these gentlemen, and counsel for
plaintiffs, being present, we convened Court, but
immediately recessed in order to give the Commission's
representatives opportunity to study the complaints and
briefs filed by plaintiffs.

At J:30 P. M., we reconvened

and heard oral arguments, from both sides, until 5:20 P. M.,
at which time the matter of the restraining orders
was submitted for decision on the oral arguments and
briefs filed by the proponents and opponents of the
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applications.

We have considered the able arguments,

studied the respective briefs and authorities cited, and
now proceed to our ruling.

Necessarily, because of

the time element, we have been compelled, under great
pressure, to consider the questions rather hastily;
and we reserve the right to alter our views, if necessary,
after more mature deliberation.
"The Court has jurisdiction.

28 u.s.c.A.

~~

1331,

1332, 2201, 2282, 2284. Jones Y.!.. Securities Commission,
298 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015.
"We are not strongly impressed with the Registrar- ··
plaintiffs' contention that the subpoenas duces tecum,
if complied with, would subject them to criminal
penalties under Louisiana law.

Literally, of course,

if they directly complied without more, they are correct
in their understanding of the State law.

Pratically,

however, another and different aspect is presented, for
under the Civil Rights Commission Act they can refuse to
produce the records, without penalties of any kind,
and the only recourse the Commiss~on would have would
be to request the Attorney General of the United States
to apply to this Court, under 42 u.s.c.A. 1975d(g)
for an order requiring their production.

Plaintiffs

then would be protected against State prosecution by
the very terms of LSA-R.S. 18:236, as well as by
LSA-R.S. 18:169 for this Court clearly is a 'competent
court', within the meaning of those Statutes.
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"Likewise, plaintiffs would suffer no immediate
federal penalties under the Act for refusal either to
appear or to testify, but would be subject to an
enforcement order from this Court, which would see to
it that their constitutional rights against self
incrimination are adequately protected.

Moreover, under

the Act, since their counsel are entitled to be present,
they could be advised, at each step of the proceedings,
whether to claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment,
even though, in this day, the general public has come
to consider such a claim as tantamount to a plea of
guilty, particularly in response to 'loaded' questions.
"We are strongly of the opinion, however, that
plaintiffs' remaining grounds for immediate relief
are well taken:
"First, it appears rather clear, at this juncture,
that the Civil Rights Commission is an 'agency' of the
Executive branch of the United States, within the
meaning of that term as defined at 5 u.s.C.A. ~ 1001 (a) .
See also 42 u.s.c.A. ~ 1975 (a).

It performs quasi

judicial functions in its hearings, its fact findings,
its studies of 'legal developments constituting a denial
of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution',
and its appraisal of 'the laws and policies of the
Federal Government' in the same respect.

It 'adjudicates'

by its rulings upon the admissibility of evidence at
its hearings and by its determinations of what is or
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is not the truth in matters before it,

Thus we think

that the Commission is subject to the provisions of
section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
requires, among other things that persons affected by
agency action '· •• shall be timely informed of the
matters of fact and law asserted.'

Here that would

encompass the nature of the charges filed against
plaintiffs, as well as the matters of fact and law
wherein the complainants' voting rights allegedly have
been violated.

The Commission also is subject to section

6 which would require it to grant plaintiffs the right
9

to conduct such cross-examination as may be required

for a full and true disclosure of the facts.

This,

by its Rules, the Commission refuses to do, and in
so doing, regardless of its well intentioned motives,
it violates the terms of that Act.

Plaintiffs are

entitled, therefore, to protection against these Rules,
which would deprive them of their plain rights under
the Act.
"Second, while the statute creating the Commission
inferentially permits it to adopt reasonable Rules,
42

u.s.c.A.

~

1975 (b), there is no provision whatsoever

in the law to the effect that such Rules may include
those here complained of, which plainly violate plaintiffs'
basic rights to know in advance with what they are charged,
to be confronted by the witnesses against them, and to
cross-examine their accusers.

We cannot believe that
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Congress intended to deny these fundamental rights to
anyone, and because of such belief it is our opinion
that these Rules of the Commission are ultra vires
and unenforceable.

Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled

to immediate relief against them.
"Third,entirely

aside from the statutory questions

just discussed, the Courts of the United States, and
'0heir Anglo-Saxon predecessors, always have seen to it

that, in hearings or trials of all kinds, persons
accused of violating laws must be adequately advised
,..~

~~-

...1-....u--aou

ae,c..ludC

them. confronted by their accusers,

and permitted to search for the truth through thorough
cross-examination.
298

In i ~ s .'Y.!.. Securities Commission,

• S. 1, 27, 57 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015, the

Supreme Court said:
"• •• 'A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial,
compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission
without any allegations, upon no fixed principles,

(

and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence,
and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice,
is unknown to our constitution and laws ;

and such

an inquisition would be destructive of the rights
of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny. Let
the power once be established, and there is no
knowing, where the practice under it would end.'
"The fear that some malefactor may go
unwhipped of justice weighs as nothing against
- 141 -

this just and strong condemnation of a practice so
odious • • •
"The philosopny that constitutional limitations
and legal restraints upon official action may be
brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance,
may follow, finds no countenance in the American
system of government.

An investigation~ based

upon specified grounds is quites& ob,jectionable
ll a search warrant~ based upon specific
statements Qf fact.

~

.a!1 investigation, .Q!:

§..!!£ha search, is unlawful !!lits inception and

cannot be made lawful !2Y what it may bring, or by
what it actually succeeds in bringing to light • • • "
In Morgan, et al v. United States, et al, 304 U.S.
1, 14, 20, 25, 5g

s.

Ct. 773, $2 D. Ed 1129, involving

an administrative hearing the Court said:
"The first question goes to the very foundation
of the action of administrative agencies entrusted
by the Congress with broad control over activities
which in their detail cannot be dealt with directly
by the legislature.

The vast expansion of this

field of administrative regulation in response to
the pressure of social needs is made possible
under our system by adherence to the basic principles
that the legislature shall appropriately determine
the standards of administrative action and that in
administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial
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character the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.

These demand

I

a fair and open hearing,•

-- essential alike to the legal validity of the
administrative regulation and to the maintenance
of public confidence in the value and soundness
of this important governmental process.

Such a

hearing has been described as an 'inexorable
safeguard. 11 •

•

•

"The answer that the proceeding before the
Secretary was not of an adversary character, as it
was not upon complaint but was initiated as a general
inquiry, is futile.

It has regard to the mere form

of the proceeding and ignores realities •
11

•

•

'Those who are brought into contest with the

Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at
the control of their activities are entitled to be
fairly advised of what the Government proposes and
to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its
final command • • • ,

11

"In the most recent decision on this subject,
handed down by the Supreme Court on June 29, 1959,
Greene~ McElroy, No. 180, October 1958 Term ____
U. S. ___, _ _ S. Ct. _ , _ _

L. Ed.

____

29 L. W. 4528, 4534, 4538, and speaking through Chief
Justice Warren, the following language is found:
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,

11

Certain principles have remained relatively

immutable in our jurisprudence.

Once of these is

that where governmental action seriously injures
an individual, and the reasonableness or the action
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to
the individual so that he has an opportunity to
show that it is untrue.

While this is important in

the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the
testimony of individuals whose memory might be
faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.

We have

formalized these protections in the requirements
of confrontation and cross-examination.
ancient roots.

They have

They find expression in the Sixth

Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases
the accused shall enjoy the right •to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.'

This Court

has been zealous to protect these rights from
erosion.

It has spoken out not only in criminal

u. s.
174 u. s. 47;

cases, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156

237, 242-244; Kirby!.!_ United States,
Motes .Y.!. United States, 178
In~ Oliver, 333

u. s. 257,

u. s. 458, 474;
273, but also in all types

of cases where administrative and regulatory action
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E • .6..:,_, Southern .!h_ Co. Y..:..

were under scrutiny.
Virginia, 290
Y..:,_

u. s.

190;

Commission, 301 U.

s.

.Q!l!.£ Eell Telephone Co.

292 ;

Carte£_ Y..:.. Kubler, 320

States, 304 U.S. 1, 19;

u. s.

243;

Morgan Y..:.. United

Reilly Y..:.. Pinkue, 338

u. s.

269.

Nor, as it has been pointed out, has Congress
ignored these fundamental requirements in enacting
regulatory legislation.

Y..:.. McGrath, 341

u. s.

Joint Anti-fascist Committee

168-169 (concurring opinion).

"Professor Wigmore, commenting on the importance
of cross examination, states in his treatise, 5 Wigmore on
Evidence ( 3d · Ed. 1949)

~

1367:

"For two centuries past, the policy of the
Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to
regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination
as a vital feature of the law.

The belief that no

safeguard for testing the value of human statements
is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination,
and the conviction that no statement (unless by
special exception) should be used as testimony until
it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has
found increasing strength in lengthening experience. 11
11

Where administrative action has raised serious

constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that
Congress or the President intended to afford those
affected by the action the traditional safeguards of
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due process.
189
297

See, e.

u. s. 86, 101 ;
u. s. 167, 172;

lfu_,

The Japanese Immigrant Case,

Dismuke Y.!.. United States,
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,

229-300 ; American Power Co. Y.!.. Securities~

u. s. 90, 107-108;
Hannegan Y.!.. Esquire, 327 u. s. 146, 156; Wong~
Sung~ McGrath, 339 u. s. 33, 49. Cf. Anniston
Mfg. Co.~ Davis, 301 u. s. 337; United States~
Rumely, 345 u. s. 41. These cases reflect the
Exchange Commission, 329

Court's concern that traditional forms of fair
procedure not be restricted by implication and
without the most explicit action by

the Nation's

lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that
the Constitution presents no inhibition."
"These authorities, therefore, clearly establish
additional reasons why plaintiffs should be granted
immediate relief.
"Fourth, there is every reason to believe 1 considering
that the Commission has announced its receipt of complaints
from some 67 persons, that those persons will testify that
plaintiffs have violated either the State or Federal laws,
or both.

Plaintiffs thus will be condemned out of the

mouths of these witnesses, and plaintiffs' testimony alone,
without having the right to cross-examine and thereby to
test the truth of such assertions, may not be adequate
to meet or overcome the charges, thus permitting plaintiffs
d

to be stigmatized and hel/ up, before the eyes of the nation

to opprobrium and scorn.

Moreover, not knowing in advance the

exact nature of the charges to be made against them, some of
the plaintiffs, whose officialdom ciles are at varying
distances up to 250 miles from Shreveport, may not be able
physically to obtain the presence of witnesses of their own,
who might negative or disprove the claims of the complaining
witnesses, especially since the Commission has announced -chat
its hearing will last only one day.
"These are further solid reasons, showing possible
or probably irreparable injury to plaintiffs, which justify
their being granted immediate relief.
"Fifth, and finally, plaintiffs raise very serious
questions regarding the validity -- the constitutionality
of the very Act which created the Commission.

We do not

intimate here any opinion as to the constitutionality of
the Statute, for that is a matter to be decided by the three
judge court to be con7ened by the Chief Judge of this Circuit.
However, the seriousness of the attack must be noted in
considering whether a temporary restraining order should be
issued, to stay the effectiveness of the Statute until its

--

validity vel non can be determined by the three-judge court
.

after hearing on plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory
injunction.

49

s.

See Ohio 011

.£2..:_ ~

Conway, 279

u. s.

813,

Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972, where the Supreme Court stated,

in a per curiam opinion:
"The application for an interlocutory injunction
was submitted on ex parte affidavits which are harmonious
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in some particulars and contradictory in other.
The affidavits, especially those for the defendant,
are open to the criticism that on some points mere
conclusions are given instead of primary facts.

Blt

enough appears to make it plain that there is a real
dispute over material questions of fact which can not
be satisfactorily resolved upon the present affidavits
and yet must be resolved before the constitutional

(

validity of the amendatory statute can be determined.
"Where the questions presented by an application
for an interlocutory injunction are grave, and the
injury to the moving party will be certain and
irreparable if the application be denied and the final
decree be in hie favor, while if the injunction be
granted the injury to opposing party, even if the
final decree be in his favor, will be inconsiderable,
or may be adequately indemnified by a bond, the injunction
usually will be granted.
&

Love Y..:,_ Atchison, Topeka

Sante Fe & Co • , 185 Fed. 321, 331-332 . "

"In Crockett Y..:,_ Hortman, 101 F. Supp.111, 115, at page
115, Judge Wright, of the Eastern District of Louisiana,

dealing with the constitutionality of a State statute, said:
"Where as here the questions presented by an
application for a temporary injunction are grave, and the
injury to the moving parties will be certain and
irreparable if the application be denied and the final
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decree be in their favor, while if the injunction be
granted the injury to opposing parties, even if the
final decree be in their favor, will be inconsiderable,
the injunction should be granted.
Conway, 279

u. s.

813, 49

s.

Ohio 011 Co. v.
---

Ct. 256, 73 L. Ed. 972.

"The determination of the grave constitutional
issues presented in this cas~ should not be decided
without a trial on the merits, Polk Co. v. Clover,

305, U.

s. 5,

59

s.

Ct. 15, 83 L. Ed. 6, and a

temporary injunction should be issued in order that
the status quo may be preserved until that time."
"To the same effect, see also Eurton, et al • .Y.!.
Matanusk~ Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F. 2d 647.
"This, then, is another ground upon which plaintiffs
are entitled to the immediate relief they seek.
"For these reasons, the application for temporary
restraining orders will be GRANTED.

L

"THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Chambers, at Shreveport,

Louisiana, on this the 12th day of July, 1959."

Mr. President, how can we, in the face of this court order,

extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission without violating
the oath of each of us to uphold the Constitution?

Would not

such an extension·necessarily imply Congressional endorsement
of the rules of the commission, and of the commission's disinclinat101.
to act pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act?

We need to

remind ourselves that we are here to uphold the Constitution and
represent the people of the several States -- not to vent our
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emotions in legislation or advance our personal political
fortunes.
The fact that an appeal from the District Court decision
is now pending before a three-judge court does not mitigate
against my point, Mr. President.
validity.

In fact, it emphasizes its

The court on appeal could not ignore the action of

Congress in extending the life of the commission.

Necessarily:

and properly, the court would have to assume that Congress acted
with full knowledge of the order of injunction.

Mr. President, for what purpose do the proponents of this
measure propose that Congress so flagrantly violate the
Constitution?

What is the nature of the goal which is so

imperative that individual liberty must be trampled in the dust?
We can only judge the proposed future of the Civil Rights
Commission on its past actions and record.
a long enough period to appraise its worth.

It has functioned for
In 1957, the proponents

of the so-called Civil Rights Bill predicted that the commission
would uncover the most dire and tragic situations existing in the
field of voting rights.

The record shows how wrong they were.

As of June 30, 1959, the conunission had received a total of only
1036 complaints, sworn and unsworn.

Out of these complaints,

on any subject within the jurisdiction of the commission, only
254 were by sworn affidavits.

The number of complaints in the voting field is even more
indicative of the lack of need for the commission.

Out of the

millions of voters in this country, the commission has received
but 315 complaints, sworn and unsworn.

In my own State of

South Carolina there were three complaints, not a one of which
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was sworn.

Even were there no constitutional question involved

in the proposed extension of the commission's existence, we
could not justify, from a simple policy standpoint, the expenditure
of the funds necessary to sustain this useless agency.
No one knows the uselessness of the commission, nor the folly
of continuing it, better than those who served as members of the
commission.

Their statements, although guarded, indicate an

extreme lack of enthusiasm which belies any sense of accomplishment.
As Dr. Hannah, the Chairman of the Commission, expressed it, that
(

in the period he had tried it, he had found "there is no right
answer to all sides 11 •

His attitude is evidently shared by his

fellow commissioners who have been reported as expressing
reluctance to serve beyond the legal life of the Commission as
established in 1957.
It is obvious, Mr. President, that the attempt to extend the
Commission is a propaganda effort, done in defiance of the
Constitution.
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